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DISEASE AND CURE? 
L. A. Powe, Jr.* 
REPUBLIC.COM. By Cass Sunstein. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 2001. Pp. 224 (cloth); 235 (paper). Cloth, $19.95; paper, $12.95. 
With the months of secrecy at the Constitutional Convention 
ended, as the delegates exited Convention Hall, someone in the 
gathered crowd asked Benjamin Franklin: "What have you given 
us?" Franklin famously replied: "A republic, if you can keep it." In 
Republic.com, Cass Sunstein1 describes this episode twice 
(pp. 105, 200-01). 
WHAT'S UP? 
Sunstein uses Franklin's remark to make two related points. First, 
citizens bear the burden of maintaining the American republic as 
a healthy, vibrant place; being a citizen is decidedly different from 
being a consumer. The former has duties, the latter wants (pp. 113-23). 
Second, and this is the gist of the slender book, the republic is 
jeopardized by the possibilities of the Internet. Sunstein assumes the 
correctness of MIT technology specialist Nicholas Negroponte's 
conclusion that in the not-too-distant future we will be able to create 
a "Daily Me" on the Internet that will provide the personalized 
information (including news) that each person chooses for him or 
herself.2 While some Internet enthusiasts have seen the "Daily Me" as 
a utopian vision, Sunstein sees instead a version of Huxley's Brave 
New World.3 He fears that users will isolate themselves from society at 
large by using the "Daily Me" as an "echo chamber[]" (p. 65) to 
preexisting views and wants, perfectly calibrated to filter out the new 
and different. 
* Anne Green Regents Chair in Law and Professor of Government, University of 
Texas. B.A. 1965, Yale; J.D. 1968, University of Washington. - Ed. 
1. Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago Law School and 
Department of Political Science. 
2. P. 2 (citing NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 153 (1995)). 
3. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRA VE NEW WORLD (1932). This distinguishes Sunstein from 
Larry Lessig, whose take on the Internet in CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 
(1999) seems closer to George Orwell's 1984 (1949). Sunstein himself has drawn this com­
parison. Alexander Stille, Adding Up the Costs of Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2001, at 
B9. Yet Sunstein claims he was never saying this world would happen, only that it could. In a 
new Afterword to the paperback edition he acknowledges that the Internet "on balance, [is] 
good for democracy." P. 204. 
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Sunstein's healthy democracy has two requirements of its citizenry. 
First, they must have an appropriate amount of culturally shared expe­
riences. Second, they must engage in a number of unanticipated 
encounters with unexpected and different people. The shared experi­
ences help provide the culture's social glue. They allow citizens who 
do not know each other and would not otherwise be aware of alterna­
tives to their own positions to become acquainted with differing views 
while nevertheless holding something in common to discuss. The great 
general-interest intermediaries - television networks, newspapers, 
Time, and Newsweek - provide this common information to all 
Americans without regard to geography or ideology. These general­
interest intermediaries maintain sufficient commonality that the issues 
and problems they discuss will thus be readily available to all. This sets 
them apart from other common cultural institutions like the enter­
tainment or advertising industries, which rarely focus on the public 
issues of the day. 
The general-interest intermediaries also contain other news that 
many citizens might not seek out - a ferry sinking in Southeast Asia, 
the number of motels in the United States owned by native-born 
Americans, or the relationship between salmon runs and dams in the 
Pacific Northwest. These stories catch the eye (or ear), and although 
they might not be what we would choose or seek out, we nevertheless 
find ourselves reading them (or listening to them). This, Sunstein 
asserts, is important. His analogy, taken from his primary area of 
constitutional law, is the public forum. 
The public forums of constitutional law - streets, sidewalks, and 
parks - are the places where speakers can say what they please "even 
if many citizens would prefer to have peace and quiet, and even if it 
seems irritating to come across protestors and dissidents when you are 
simply walking home or to the local grocery store" (p. 27). For those 
coming across the protestors and dissidents, there is no duty to stop or 
even to pay momentary attention, but there is the opportunity to do 
so.4 That, for Sunstein, is the key. The public forums provide the 
opportunity for all of us to encounter unexpected (and perhaps 
unwanted) experiences and - even better, should we pause - argu­
ments. In supplementing our lives with these new developments, we 
are enriched by our greater awareness of the heterogeneous society in 
which we live. 
Sunstein is not myopic, and he knows that the previous paragraph 
describes an older era.5 Whether through changes in lifestyles or the 
4. Were it not for the opportunity of chance encounters, sports fans would never have 
known the opinions of John Rocker, a rural Southerner (who could also throw a good fast­
ball), on the riders of the Number 7 train to New York City's Shea Stadium. 
5. P. 196. Sunstein's description of the era is nostalgic. It reminds me of Justice Black's 
soulful lament in United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), concerning 
the continuing demise of the mom-and-pop grocery stores of Los Angeles which were 
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ossification of the public-forum doctrine itself,6 public forums just 
aren't that important. Sunstein thus quotes Justice Kennedy's apt 
observation: "Minds are not changed in the streets and parks as they 
once were. To an increasing degree, the more significant interchanges 
of ideas and shaping of public consciousness occur in the mass 
and electronic media."7 Enter the Internet with all its possibilities to 
operate as a super public forum.8 
Sunstein worries, however, that the "Daily Me" will not only stifle 
this possibility, but will in fact make things worse. As to the former, 
the "Daily Me" will operate as a technological cocoon giving its 
master only the preselected views and information he wishes. Dissent, 
discord, and difference will be left suspended elsewhere as the "Daily 
Me" works its magic. While the opportunities for new experiences will 
be there, they can happen only if the user intentionally seeks them 
out, not by the necessary inadvertence that occurs naturally in a public 
forum. Democracy will suffer - but that is not the half of it. 
Sunstein's primary fear of the "Daily Me" is that it will create 
group polarization and extremism (pp. 65-77). He relies upon various 
well-accepted studies that demonstrate that when like-minded indi­
viduals deliberate together their views shift to the extreme.9 Thus if 
many "Daily Me" filters place like-minded people in the same sites, 
Sunstein believes, and fears, that moderation will be abandoned in 
favor of extremism. "Indeed, the Internet creates a large risk of group 
polarization, simply because it makes it so easy for like-minded people 
to speak with one another - and ultimately to move toward extreme 
and sometimes even violent positions" (p. 199). Sunstein also fears 
"cybercascades" of information where members of various groups will 
supposedly being done in by voracious chain stores. There was not a trace of understanding 
that freeways and cars contributed to the situation. I was similarly struck by the absence of 
cars in Sunstein's world of the public forum, right down to people "walking . . . to the local 
grocery store." P. 27. Not only has the United States that Sunstein hails passed into history, 
but it also seems to consist roughly of the triangle of the nation where Major League Base­
ball existed in 1953: no farther West than St. Louis and no farther South than Washington, 
D.C. In his Afterword, Sunstein acknowledges reliance on JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND 
LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961), which confirms my view that he was describing a 
regional phenomenon. I will assume, nevertheless, that his description is more or less cor­
rect. 
6. Nicely on display in International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 
U.S. 672 (1992). 
7. P. 29 (quoting Denver Area Educ. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 802-03 (1996) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting)). 
8. "[T]he Internet is allowing many millions of people, all over the globe, to expand 
their horizons and to encounter new topics and ideas. " P. 206. 
9. ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (2d ed. 1996); JOHN SABINI, SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY (2d ed. 1995); see also p. 218 nn.9-19. 
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all acquire the same rumors and claims simultaneously and then 
reinforce them to each other.10 
Having diagnosed a potential threat to our democracy, what does 
Sunstein believe should be done? We need links. Actually, Sunstein 
offers six different remedies (tracing their origins to broadcast 
regulation).11 They are a truly mixed bag, which is why they can be 
summarized as links between websites. Two go beyond this. One is the 
creation of deliberative chat rooms that will allow everyone to access 
and participate in cyberspace public forums (subsidized by govern­
ment, if necessary). The other is a voluntary disclosure - by 
broadcasters12 - of the public issues they have discussed in the 
previous quarter. The key, however, is links from both partisan web­
sites and those lucky websites that are popular. Links will allow the 
user the opportunity to go elsewhere and find different views at 
the click of a mouse. Sunstein hopes that the remedies would be 
10. Pp. 80-84. The data, however, shows that most users access mainstream websites. 
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace 2.0, 79 TEXAS L. REV. 447, 467-69 (2000) (book 
review). 
l l. Sunstein's remedies: 
1. deliberative domains; 2. disclosure of relevant conduct by producers of communications; 3. 
voluntary self-regulation; 4. economic subsidies, including publicly subsidized programming 
and Websites; 5. 'must carry' rules, in the form of links, imposed on the most popular Web­
sites, designed to produce exposure to substantive questions; and 6. 'must carry' rules, also in 
the form of links, imposed on highly partisan Websites, designed to ensure that viewers learn 
about sites with opposing views, perhaps through linked sites and perhaps through hyper­
links. 
P. 169. 
12. Disclosure requirements of various sorts might, for example, be imposed on: 
television broadcasters, radio broadcasters, cable television, and Website providers . . . .  The 
disclosure might include an accounting of any free airtime provided to candidates, opportu­
nities to speak for those addressing public issues, rights of reply, educational programming, 
charitable activities. programming designed for traditionally underserved communities, 
closed captioning for the hearing impaired, local programming, and public service an­
nouncements. 
P. 174. Sunstein wraps his proposal in Justice Brandeis's idea that "sunlight is the best of 
disinfectants, " p. 174 (internal quotation marks omitted), although it is not clear that there is 
any infection. Still, the proposal initially seems somewhere between helpful and innocuous. 
Then the older among us remember the FCC's Ascertainment Policy, which turned the 
simple requirement that a broadcaster know its community into a procedural maze followed 
by litigation over trivia. See THOMAS G. KRATIENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., 
REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 79-81 (1994). For a pithy summation, see id. at 
365 (index item immediately following "I Love Lucy "). Sunstein's disclosure file would seem 
ripe for similar complaints that the broadcaster did not spend enough time doing X or spent 
too much time doing Y. Beyond that, just what does a new regulation for broadcasters have 
to do with a book on the dangers the Internet may pose for our democracy? One is tempted 
to answer that Sunstein has some of the qualities of Pavlov's dog: when he thinks regulation, 
he thinks of another duty that could be attached to broadcasters. 
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voluntarily adopted,13 but given their television pedigree, he would not 
hesitate to have the federal government impose them if necessary.1 4 
WHAT?? 
Something, perhaps a lot, is just plain wrong with the argument in 
Republic.com. The mistake is not logical, for the book proceeds in a 
nice linear fashion. If there is error, it is in the data. The Internet 
seems to be quite a boon; yet Sunstein sees it as posing a threat to our 
democracy.15 What's the evidence? Now suppose he is right: Will 
"links" really save us? It seems such a trivial remedy for such a serious 
problem. Again, where's the evidence it will work? At some basic 
level it seems that Sunstein is wrong about either the disease or the 
cure. Or both. 
So many different things pose a threat to our democracy: lack of 
real campaign-finance reform, voter apathy, corporate control over 
government, the liberal media, the imperial judiciary, Rush Limbaugh 
and Fox News, racism, globalization and the WTO, the failures of 
public education, lack of true deliberative opinion polls. Now the 
Internet. A couple of decades ago it was the paucity of available 
information sources (and their blandness); now it is their abundance 
(with their ideological edge). Maybe American democracy can never 
get it right; maybe democracy is inherently at risk. I don't know, and I 
don't think Sunstein does either. To the extent he does, he views the 
problem as the threat of group polarization. 
His book is permeated by the fear that members of groups on both 
the right and the left16 will use the opportunities of the Internet 
to meet, chat, and thus have their preexisting ideological views 
reinforced so that they move toward the extreme. Indeed, Sunstein 
asserts that this is already occurring (p. 71). Should this continue, we 
13. He reports that of his random study of sixty political websites only nine offered links 
to opposing sites while thirty-five offered them to like-minded sites. P. 59. 
14. "Ideally, such links would be provided voluntarily. It might also be worthwhile to 
consider legislation designed to ensure more in the way of links and hyperlinks, on a view­
point-neutral basis." P. 186. "If [voluntary efforts] do not work, it would be worthwhile con­
sidering content-neutral regulation, designed to ensure more in the way of both links and 
hyperlinks." P. 188. 
15. Again, it is worth noting that he backs away from this position in the Afterword, first 
acknowledging the Internet is "a fantastic boon," p. 203, and then offering: "Instead of ask­
ing whether the Internet is good for democracy on balance, we should be trying to identify 
the ways that it is good and the ways that it might be bad." P. 204. Thus reconceived, Repub­
lic.com is a warning about a potentially harmful effect that has yet to occur. 
16. Especially on the right. To find a left extremist group in Republic.com requires going 
back in time to either "the civil rights movement, the antislavery movement, or the move­
ment for sex equality. Each of these movements was extreme in its time, and within-group 
discussion certainly bred greater extremism; but extremism should not be a word of oppro­
brium." P. 75. He does not say that about any group on the right, past or present. 
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will have more citizens on the extremes and the distance between left 
and right will become greater. 
If the public is balkanized and if different groups are designing their own 
preferred communications packages, the consequence will be not merely 
the same but still more balkanization, as group members move one an­
other toward more extreme points in line with their initial tendencies. At 
the same time, different deliberating groups, each consisting of like­
minded people, will be driven increasingly far apart, simply because most 
of their discussions are with one another. (p. 66) 
The problem consists of group polarization combined with social 
fragmentation. 
The keys to group polarization are the emphasis on group identity 
and the ability of group members to maintain relative anonymity. As 
Sunstein notes: "These are of course characteristic features of delib­
eration via the Internet" (p. 72). A necessary conclusion is that the 
findings of the literature on group polarization apply similarly to the 
Internet, even though everything on the Internet happens on a 
computer screen. Sunstein has been writing within this social-science 
literature for some time now, and I have no reason to doubt his 
conclusion.17 
Sunstein tells us that group polarization is occurring on the Inter­
net, and he offers links as the key remedy. For those who use them, 
links make alternatives available. In a pre-Internet world, newspapers 
or television networks did the same. And yet group polarization still 
occurred (or could occur). How are links going to hinder group polari­
zation in an Internet world?18 Will a sufficient number of people (who 
meet the criteria for potential polarization) access them? Will they 
take the time to read them? Will reading the alternatives then move 
them back toward the center (or halt their movement to the extreme)? 
Sunstein offers no evidence on this score.1 9 
In a book concerned with a problem premised on the existence of a 
body of social-science evidence, one would expect the remedy also 
to be grounded in social-science evidence. Sunstein's remedy is 
wonderfully Brandeisian: more speech, speech rebutting speech. But 
the concept of group polarization is premised on the fact that 
17. Indeed, I was unaware of this literature until an earlier paper by Sunstein brought it 
to my attention. With the exception of Dan Hunter, Philippic.com, 90 CAL. L. REV. 611 
(2002) (reviewing Republic.com) my knowledge of it is limited to Sunstein's writings. Hunter 
doubts Sunstein's analysis of the literature's application to the Internet. Id. at 641-52. It 
would be presumptuous (not to mention preposterous) for me to read the literature and 
pretend I could offer an answer as to who is correct. 
18. Links to alternatives that currently exist are largely designed "to show how danger­
ous, or dumb, or contemptible the views of the adversary really are." Pp. 59-60. To work, 
Sunstein's remedy will have to deal in some way with this problem (if it is a problem). 
19. "(W]e need to have a much fuller sense of the extent to which people are using the 
Internet to engage in deliberation only or mostly with those who are like-minded." P. 208. 
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counterspeech is not accessed or else doesn't get through. The Inter­
net may make acquisition of alternative information easier, but this 
doesn't guarantee that the information will be accessed even if there is 
an offered link on the page. 
If our democracy is threatened by group polarization via the Inter­
net, then I doubt links will save us. The solution seems incommensu­
rately weak compared to the problem - and this assumes there is evi­
dence that links would work. If having alternatives available at the 
click of a mouse will keep our democracy vibrant, then it must be in 
pretty good shape already. 
Much the same can be said for Sunstein's secondary idea of delib­
erative domains on the Internet where one can go for discussions of 
public issues by people with differing viewpoints. Who is going to go 
there? How many of these will be individuals who would otherwise be 
in an ideological chatroom gaining reinforcement of preexisting 
views? I'm all for democratic deliberation, and having some websites 
available is probably a good thing,2° but I don't see how it relates to 
group polarization, and I wonder if those who would use it are those 
who need it most.21 
The fit between disease and prescription is so bad that one 
searches for explanations. Perhaps it is preventive medicine. Possibly 
it is a regulator's desire for regulation for regulation's sake. Both 
possibilities make sense, and both are suggested in the Afterword 
(pp. 204, 210). 
If large numbers of people take advantage of Sunstein's links and 
the incredible opportunities the Internet provides, then maybe group 
polarization will not occur. Or, even if it does, its incidence might be 
so minimal that it would not matter. 
Regulation for regulation's sake is an answer to Justice Stevens's 
opinion in Reno v. ACLU,22 striking down the Communications 
Decency Act. In an effort to distinguish its decision in FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation23 from the problems associated with the Internet, the 
Court distinguished broadcasting from the ·internet. Within the same 
paragraph the Court noted the "history of extensive Government 
regulation" of broadcasting and the "type of government supervision 
and regulation" that has not been attempted with the Internet.24 To 
some extent the Court was saying that broadcasting could be regulated 
because it always had been whereas the Internet can't because 
20. A subsidy for goodies that appeal to academics has a nice democratic ring to it. 
21. My colleague Neil Netanel called my attention to the miserably low levels of discus-
sion, tolerance, and exchange on discussion sites of the New York Times and CNN. 
22. 521 U.S. 844, 849-85 (1997). 
23. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
24. Reno, 521 U.S. at 868-69. 
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government hasn't. The message is that if Congress wants to regulate 
later, it must regulate now.25 Sunstein has an interesting sentence 
in the Afterword implying that one of his purposes in writing 
Republic.com, albeit not the prime one, was to get some regulation 
going.26 Easy and innocuous regulations at first; more extensive ones, 
if necessary, later. 
WHAT'S DOWN? 
The First Amendment.27 In seven separate places (eight including 
the Afterword (p. 210)), Sunstein states that the First Amendment is 
not absolute (pp. 14, 142, 151 (twice), 153, 166, 198). Why so often? 
Wouldn't the quick examples of President Clinton's perjury or some­
one's stock fraud be sufficient to show anyone that the First Amend­
ment could not absolutely protect all speech? Seven times seems at 
least five too many. 
Sunstein might respond that he is writing for an (Internet) culture 
that has so imbedded the idea of an absolute First Amendment that 
the obvious truth must be asserted and reasserted as frequently as 
possible, just to break through the intellectual barriers to receiving the 
message.28 Seven should do it and thereafter the readers will accept his 
very accurate synthesis of the relevant First Amendment doctrine. 
Still, seven is a lot, especially in a short book. That leads me to an 
alternative hypothesis. Sunstein is letting the sentence "the First 
Amendment is not absolute" do some intellectual lifting. For over a 
decade Sunstein has promoted a New Deal29/Madisonian30/vision of 
the democratic31 vision of the First Amendment32 - one where the 
idea that the First Amendment would preclude governmental action is 
25. L.A. Powe. Jr., Program Content Regulation Revisited, in COMMUNICATIONS 
DEREGULATION AND FCC REFORM 145, 169-70 (Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Randolph J. May 
eds., 2001) (suggesting that the Court is no longer enamoured with its broadcast jurispru­
dence). 
26. "[T]he principal goal of this book is not to argue for more government regulation of 
the Internet." P. 210 (emphasis added). 
27. Or, with more honesty, the liberal interpretation of the First Amendment. 
28. This could be yet another example of group polarization. Internet aficionados go to 
the extreme view on the meaning of free speech, and the most extreme available for their 
general view is that anything goes all the time. 
29. Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1992) [hereinafter Sun­
stein, Free Speech Now] ; Cass R. Sunstein, A New Deal fur Speech, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & 
ENT. L.J. 137 (1994) [hereinafter Sunstein, A New Deal for Speech]. 
30. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993). 
31. While he never uses the phrase "democratic First Amendment," Republic.com fairly 
rings with the idea - "promoting the values associated with a system of free expression, 
emphatically including democratic self-government." P. 198; .yee also pp. 146, 154. 
32. The First Amendment is apparently not so sweet with just its plain old name. 
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understood to be misguided and backward (and perhaps antidemo­
cratic as well). One may start thinking about the First Amendment in 
Sunstein's world by noting that: the First Amendment is not absolute; 
therefore, government may take some necessary actions - to wit, the 
ones he advocates - which, of course, will improve33 the quality of our 
democracy.34 
Links will do that.35 Therefore his "must carry" proposal must be 
constitutional. But is it? After quickly mentioning the Red Lion 
Broadcasting v. FCC36-Miami Herald v. Tornillo31 split, Sunstein intro­
duces Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC ("Turner J/")38 by noting 
that "the Court has nonetheless upheld legislation that imposes 'must 
carry' rules on cable television providers" (p. 183). The cable must­
carry rules require cable systems to provide channels for local 
commercial and educational stations when (and if) those stations 
demand that their signal be carried on the cable system. Sunstein 
explains the Court's 5-4 ruling39 in two different ways. First, the must­
carry rules assure "that the public has access to a multiplicity of infor­
mation sources. "40 Second, the rules operate to prevent the "potential 
for abuse of . . .  private power over a central avenue of communica­
tion."41 The latter is the bottleneck monopoly theory. The former 
sounds just like Sunstein's democracy-enhancing theory. But it must 
be tied back into Congress's conclusion that must carry was necessary 
to preserve an unknown number of over-the-air stations that would go 
dark if not given cable access.42 Sunstein alludes to this in a prior 
sentence,43 but it is about Congress rather than the Court. 
33. Or, to put a little rational basis jargon in, may be thought to improve. 
34. Sunstein writes: "A central part of the U.S. constitutional tradition, then, places a 
high premium on speech that is critical to democratic processes, and is hardly hostile to gov­
ernment efforts to promote such speech." Pp. 155-56. 
35. So Sunstein asserts. 
36. 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (sustaining the Fairness Doctrine). 
37. 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding unconstitutional a right of reply statute). 
38. 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (hereinafter Turner II]. 
39. Actually, and sensibly given the book's target audience, he never mentions the vote. 
40. P. 183 (quoting Turner II, supra note 38, 520 U.S. at 227 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994) [hereinafter 
Turner I] (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
41. Id. 
42. Justice Breyer agreed that the must-carry rules extracted a First Amendment price, 
but he found the price balanced out: "The statute's basic noneconomic purpose is to prevent 
too precipitous a decline in the quality and quantity of programming choice for an ever­
shrinking non-cable-subscribing segment of the public." Turner II, supra note 38, 520 U.S. at 
226 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
43. "Congress defended these requirements as a way of ensuring the economic viability 
of broadcasters, on whom many millions of Americans continue to rely (about 30% as of 
2000)." P. 183. 
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Cable must-carry rules, like both the Fairness Doctrine and the 
right-of-reply statute in Tomi/lo, do not add any information to the 
system. People often attempt to claim that they do, but that cannot be 
accurate unless one assumes that the channel (or airtime) would 
be left idle. What must-carry rules do is substitute one piece of 
(preferred) information for another piece (or type) of information that 
would otherwise occupy that time slot or channel. It is different 
information, not more information. 
Turner II, as Sunstein fully recognizes (p. 184), does not answer the 
question of whether his must-carry links would pass constitutional 
muster. It is too Orwellian to claim that the Internet is a bottleneck 
monopoly. Nor are various websites likely to fold unless they are 
linked to other websites. If the links proposal is constitutional, it has to 
be because "it seeks to facilitate . . . public discussion and informed 
deliberation"44 and therefore is designed "to promote goals associated 
with deliberative democracy" (p. 184). A plus for Sunstein is that his 
proposal does not require any substituting of information; it really 
does seem like something that simply adds. The minus is that rhetoric 
about deliberative democracy alone is not enough to save a statute 
that requires a speaker to say either more or less than the speaker 
wishes to say. High-sounding phrases did not convince the Court in 
Tornillo,45 Buckley v. Valeo,46 or First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti . 47 When they did work, in cases like Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce,48 Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government 
PAC,49 and FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign 
Committee50 it was because, as in Turner II, they were attached to 
something else - in those cases, the appearance of corruption. The 
reason the Court requires something more than good intentions is 
simple. Promoting democratic deliberation is a game that anyone can 
play - Sunstein has done it a lot. To separate the good from the bad, 
the Court has wisely demanded more than a good heart before 
accepting speech-limiting proposals. 
44. P. 183 (quoting Turner II, supra note 38, 520 U.S. at 227 (Breyer, J., concurring)). 
45. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
46. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (striking down expenditure limitation provisions of campaign­
finance reform). 
47. 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (striking down a limit on corporate expenditures on a ballot 
initiative). 
48. 494 U.S. 692 (1990) (upholding limit on corporate expenditures in candidate 
election). 
49. 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (upholding contribution limitations in candidate election). 
50. 533 U.S. 431 (2001) (upholding the prohibition of party expenditures coordinated 
with those of the candidate because otherwise contribution limits could be too easily circum­
vented). 
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There is one notable exception - broadcasting's Fairness 
Doctrine.51 For decades it was the regulator's dream, a policy that (its 
supporters believed) added views, promoted debate, and helped 
create an informed citizenry. The Fairness Doctrine required a broad­
caster to determine if it had presented one side of a controversial issue 
of public importance and then, if so, to select how the other side would 
be presented and who would present it. A decade ago Sunstein 
announced that Red Lion, in sustaining the Fairness Doctrine by 
almost suggesting that it was constitutionally compelled, was the New 
Deal First Amendment interpretation. Red Lion recognizes and 
sustains the government's essential role in promoting deliberative 
democracy (and the importance of not leaving this to the workings of 
the marketplace).52 
Yet the Fairness Doctrine is becoming a distant memory.53 The 
debates that led to its demise never quite joined issue. The supporters 
of the doctrine cited its rhetoric of fairness, balance,54 and an informed 
citizenry. They claimed that it operated in accordance with its lofty 
rhetoric; therefore it was terrific. To the extent it did not operate to 
achieve its objectives the fault was the broadcasters' breach of their 
fiduciary duty to their viewers and listeners (and the failure of the 
FCC to do its job ).55 Opponents of the Fairness Doctrine charged that 
it operated as a tax on controversy and therefore necessarily chilled 
debate; when debate did occur, it was limited to the two establishment 
viewpoints.56 
Even as he embraced Red Lion, Sunstein understood that the case 
against the Fairness Doctrine was compelling.57 In Republic.com he 
offers a novel way of turning the Fairness Doctrine's defeat into 
victory. Still holding to the now-proven58 view that the Fairness 
51. Even this may not be an exception if one believes that "scarcity" (no matter how 
absurd) was the something else to which the court was attached. 
52. See Sunstein, Free Speech Now, supra note 29, at 275-78; Sunstein, A New Deal for 
Speech, supra note 29, at 146-48. 
53. See Inquiry into § 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning 
the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 143, 146 
(1985) (finding the Fairness Doctrine unconstitutional); Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 
F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding FCC's conclusion that Fairness Doctrine is unconstitu­
tional). 
54. This was before Fox News. 
55. I spent two years on a national ACLU committee considering the ACLU's position 
on the Fairness Doctrine, and the text faithfully describes its supporters' position (which in 
turn mirrors the public debate). A truly vigorous defense of the Fairness Doctrine, made by 
a former FCC Chairman on the eve of its demise, is Charles D. Ferris & James A. Kirkland, 
Fairness- The Broadcaster's Hippocratic Oath, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 605 (1985). 
56. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 12, at 237-75. 
57. Cass Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499, 525-26 (2000). 
58. Prior to the demise of the Fairness Doctrine there was no way to prove - rather 
than assert based on pretty good premises - what the world would look like were there no 
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Doctrine minimized opportunities to hear controversial views, he 
implies this was a plus. Undoubtedly thinking of Rush Limbaugh (and 
would-be imitators even farther to the right), he notes that the 
"growth of a wide variety of issues-oriented programming [made 
possible by the demise of the Fairness Doctrine] - expressing strong, 
often extreme views, and appealing to dramatically different groups of 
listeners and viewers - is likely to create group polarization" (p. 74). 
Sunstein's links proposal is nowhere near as likely to be effective in 
toning down controversy, although it will have some of the implemen­
tation problems of the Fairness Doctrine.59 
Just as defining the controversial issue was the key to choosing the 
other side under the Fairness Doctrine, so, too, with Sunstein's must 
carry. Assuming that a website is covered by the must-carry links 
requirement, to whom should it offer links? Start with the two political 
parties. Obviously they should link each other. But should the 
Republicans also link the Reform site and the Democrats link the 
Greens? Perhaps everyone should link everyone! 
What about nonpolitical ideological websites? Let's use the 
Brookings Institute, which might consider itself so mainstream that it 
has no ideology. But if it must have links, then to whom? Suppose it 
selects the Institute of Policy Studies ("IPS") on the left and the Cato 
Institute on the right. Both are ideological opposites, and accessing 
their websites would offer plenty of diversity. But what about the 
American Enterprise Institute ("AEI")? Wouldn't it be a more logical 
link? If Brookings avoids AEI and just links to IPS and Cato, what 
will someone who visits each website conclude except that Brookings 
is sweet reasonableness incarnate?60 This is something that might not 
be so readily inferable if the range of offered links included AEI. 
I am not sure what lessons can be drawn from this. One is that for 
many websites the selection of links will offer the possibility of 
successful market positioning.61 A second and more likely response is 
such doctrine. Once it was repealed, a before and after could be studied, and the proof was 
overwhelming that there was more controversy on radio (the medium studied) without the 
Doctrine. Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, Was the Fairness Doctrine a "Chilling Ef­
fect"? Evidence from the Postderegulation Radio Market, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1997) (an­
swering the title question with a resounding yes). 
59. I will leave the sanctions problem to Sunstein or others later and just note in passing 
that the characteristics of a partisan or popular website that needs to provide links may be 
contestable. Sunstein, for instance, was surprised by an email from a reader of RepiJb/ic.com 
suggesting that Sunstein was a hypocrite because his own website lacked links to others. 
Sunstein has remedied the defect (if any). Lisa Guernsey, Evolving £-Books Let Authors 
Answer Critics, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at G4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/ 
05/10/technology/l OCASS.html. 
60. I offer this example based on · Sunstein's own websites, 
http://www.FreeRepublic.com and http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/sunstein/. When he 
created links they were to Catherine MacKinnon and Richard Epstein. Who wouldn't be­
lieve Sunstein is the reasonable party in that grouping? 
61. As discussed in the current efforts to use links to demonize. See supra note 18. 
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that anyone who takes the initiative of jumping from one website to 
another is likely to learn of AEI (or the relevant choice) in some way 
or another. In all likelihood, this heads right back to the earlier ques­
tion. Who is likely to use the links and do these individuals really need 
a regulatory requirement that they be provided? Before advocating 
legislation, we need some data acquisition. 
Looking back, we can see the effects of Gutenberg's invention on 
European Christendom. The printing press was indeed revolutionary. 
In the past century, virtually every new communications technol­
ogy has been charged with upsetting existing morality and societal 
harmony.62 It began with silent movies. By the 1930s, it was the 
"talking pictures." Then, following World War II, it was comic books 
quickly shifting to television.63 Then all the best sex and violence 
migrated to cable. Now it's the. Internet. Maybe democracy - that 
worst form of government apart from all the alternatives - is 
inherently at risk. Or maybe we always fear the unknown. 
Cass Sunstein has a wonderful corpus of scholarship. But 
Republic.com does not add to it even though the initial reviews (help­
fully gathered on the back of the paperback edition) were highly 
positive. They are best understood as the analogue of the dot-com 
bubble of the late 1990s when virtually everything with ".coni" at the 
end of its name was wildly overvalued. Just as it would have been 
better had many final holders of dot-com stock not invested, it would 
have been better if Sunstein had not published Republic.com. The 
Afterword suggests that Sunstein knows this as well. 
62. Radio was the exception, perhaps because it was so hard to take it seriously. See 
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 22-30 
(1987). 
63. These are described in more detail in Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., 
Televised Violence: First Amendment Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REV . 
1123, 1288-92 (1978). 
